Observing the Second Day of Yom Tov in Israel and the Diaspora When One is a Visitor

The following responsum is reprinted from Tomeikh KaHalakhah volume 3.  Tomeikh KaHalakhah is UTJ’s series of volumes of responsa (teshuvot) promulgated by the Union For Traditional Judaism’s Panel of Halakhic Inquiry.

The multifaceted question posed here revolves around the status of Israeli Jews in the Diaspora or Diaspora Jews visiting Israel for the holiday season, an issue that has engendered much discussion in rabbinic literature. For a guide to literally dozens of rabbinic responsa on this topic, see Otsar Ha-she’elot U-teshuvot (Jerusalem 1991), vol. 8, pp. 7-14. For a sampling of the variety of views in halakhic handbooks on this question, see Rabbi Hayyim David Halevi, Mekor Hayyim Ha-Shalem, ch. 198, pars. 43-48, vol. 4, pp. 164-165; Rabbi Avraham Danzig, Hayyei Adam, ch. 103, pars. 3-4; Rabbi Avrohom Blumenkrantz, The Laws of Pesach: A Digest (1988 edition), ch. 12, pp. 133-135; Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, Am Ke-Lavi, pars. 174-176, pp. 147-149; Rabbi Moshe Stern, Responsa Be’er Moshe, printed at the end of vol. 7, pp. 252-300. The most inclusive summary of views is found in Rabbi Yerahmiel Fried, Yom Tov Sheni Ke-hilkhato (Jerusalem, 1988; English translation recently appeared), especially chapters 2-3 and 5-6; this book presents an almost dizzying array of views on every imaginable aspect of the subject of Yom Tov Sheni, based both on the voluminous responsa literature and on oral and written communications from leading Israeli poskim such as Rabbis Auerbach and Elyashiv.

In the final analysis, the various positions developed on the question under consideration here stem from the interpretation of the Mishnah Pesahim 4:1, the related Gemara in Pesahim 51a-b; and two additional stories that quote the above Mishnah. For the purposes of our analysis we reproduce the texts here in translation, with some pertinent comments:

Pesahim 4:1—[In] a place where people are accustomed to do work on the eve of Passover until midday, one may do so; [in] a place where people are accustomed not to do work, one may not do work. One who goes from a place where they do [work] to a place where they do not, or from a place where they do not to a place where they do, we apply to him the strict rulings of the place from where he came, and the place to which he has come, but one should not behave differently because [it may lead to] dispute.

Pesahim 51b—“One who goes from a place etc.” It is well regarding one who comes from a place where they do work to a place where they do not do work, we place upon him the strictures of the place to which he has come, and one should not behave differently because it may lead to dispute—let him not do work; but from a place where they do not do work to a place where they do work, and one should not behave differently because it may lead to dispute—let him do work [and thus not stand out], but you have said we place upon him the strictures of the place whence he has come [where no work was done] and the place to which he has come. Abaye said: it [the phrase not to act differently] applies to the first clause of the Mishnah. Rava said: it applies rather also to the latter clause, and this is what it means: this does not cause dispute [that is, if a person who comes from a place where they refrain from work and follows the stricter custom of his home]. What would a person say? That work is forbidden? [And this person differs with our practice], he would say rather that there are a number of idlers in the marketplace [thus this person would not arouse any attention or dispute].

Pesahim 51a—When Rabbah bar Bar Hanah came [from the Land of Israel], he ate of the stomach fat [which by Babylonian custom was forbidden]. Now, Rabbi Avira the Elder and Rabbah bar Rav Huna visited him; as soon as he saw them, he covered it [the fat] from them. When they narrated it to Abaye [other readings: “to his father” or “to the father of Shmuel”], he said to them, “he has treated you like Cutheans [Samaritans—that is, as ignorant persons, as opposed to scholars who would have understood that Rabbah bar Bar Hanah had a different custom and would not have drawn any unwarranted conclusions from his behavior].” But does not Rabbah bar Bar Hanah agree with what we learned: we apply to him the strict rulings of the place whence he came, and the place to which he has come? Abaye said: that applies only [when he goes] from Babylonia to Babylonia, or from the land of Israel to the land of Israel, or from Babylonia to the land of Israel; but from the land of Israel to Babylonia, since we are subservient to them, we do as they [in this case, Rabbah bar Bar Hanah could follow the more lenient ruling of the land of Israel, since Palestinian Jewry’s leadership was of a higher status]. Rav Ashi said: you may even say from the land of Israel to Babylonia; that is, however, where it is not his intention to return, but Rabbah bar Bar Hanah intended to return.

Hullin 18b—When Rabbi Zeira went up [to the land of Israel] he ate there of an animal [slaughtered in a place on the throat] considered a deflection [i.e., slaughtered in an improper location on the throat, and hence nonkosher] by Rav and Shmuel….But does not Rabbi Zeira accept the rule: we apply to him the strict rulings of the place whence he came, and the place to which he has come? This rule applies only when one travels from town to town in Babylonia, or from town to town in the land of Israel, or from the land of Israel to Babylonia, but when one travels from Babylonia to the land of Israel, since we are subject to their authority, we must adopt their customs. Rav Ashi said: you may even hold that the rule applies when one travels from Babylonia to the land of Israel, but only when a person had the intention to return; Rabbi Zeira, however, had no intention to return.

Hullin 110a—In Sura people did not eat the udder; in Pumbeditha they used to eat it. Rami bar Tamri, also known as Rami bar Dikuli, of Pumbeditha happened to be in Sura on the eve of Yom Kippur. When the townspeople took all the udders and threw them away, he went immediately and collected them and ate them. He was then brought before Rav Hisda, who said to him: why did you do it? He replied: I come from the place of Rav Yehudah, who permits it to be eaten. Rav Hisda said to him: but do you not accept the rule—we apply to him the strict rulings of the place whence he came, and the place to which he has come? He replied: I ate them outside the town’s boundary.

This collection of sources presents numerous textual and logical difficulties. On the textual difficulties of the two stories, see, e.g., the questions raised by Tosafot, Pesahim 51a s.v. avdinan kevataihu and s.v. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah da’ato la’hazor hava. For scholarly attempts in resolving the textual difficulties, see the discussion of my honored teacher Professor David Weiss Halivni in his Mekorot U-Mesorot on Eruvin and Pesahim (Jerusalem 1982), pp. 419-420 and notes there. He resolves the difficulties in the texts by regarding the discussion in Pesahim as “transferred” from Hullin. In the process of transferring the texts, the discussion did not exactly “fit” in its new location. Attempts at adjusting the texts only created new difficulties. See also the ingenious suggestions by Rabbi Yosef Tzvi Halevi Dunner in his Hiddushei Ha-Ritzad, part I (Jerusalem 1981), p. 176. For the latest summary of scholarly views on the problems involved in the Talmudic texts cited above from Pesahim and Hullin, see Aaron Amit, “An Edition and Comprehensive Commentary on Chapter IV of Tractate Pesahim in the Babylonian Talmud” (PhD thesis, Bar-Ilan University 1999), pp. 109-126, 142-156. Amit offers a number of new interpretations and novel solutions for the problems noted by both medieval commentators and modern critical scholars.

Another problem is defining which of the clauses of the Mishnah is the “controlling factor”—the “double stricture” rule or the rule not to deviate from local practice lest one cause dispute, as at least in some circumstances the two would seem to be in conflict (see, e.g., Rashi’s commentary on the story of Rabbah bar Bar Hanah in Pesahim 51a). The Talmud was conscious of this, and thus had to explain the case of a person who comes to a place where people do work on the eve of Passover, and he comes from a place where people refrain from working. To honor the humra (strict ruling) of the place whence he came he refrains from work, and the Talmud explains that this would not arouse any dispute by noting that there are many idlers in the marketplace at any given moment. The Jerusalem Talmud ad loc. seems to regard the prevention of mahloket (dispute) as the main concern, so that a notable person whose inactivity would be noticed would have to do work, lest he cause dispute. See also the commentary of Rabbi Shlomo Adani, Melekhet Shlomo, on the Mishnah in Pesahim, where he makes a similar point. Professor Halivni offers an elegant solution to this problem by proposing that the phrase about avoiding dispute in the Mishnah refers to the very beginning of the Mishnah (makom she’nahagu…) and not to what immediately precedes it, thus obviating the question of the Gemara.

Logically, we encounter the problem as to when exactly the “double-stricture rule” would apply. If the person intended to settle permanently in the place to which he has come, then his original place has no hold over him, and he would observe the customs of his new place, whether more strict or more lenient than those of his original home. On the other hand, if he intended to return to his original home, then it is as if he never left home, so the customs of the place that he has come to have no hold on him. In addition, there is the difficult problem of fitting the series of stories in the Gemara at the beginning of chapter 4 of Pesahim into a satisfactory explanatory framework, since the stories appear one after the other with little discussion, and appear to reflect a variety of behavior patterns by visitors confronted with local customs at odds with their own and possibly at odds with established Halakhah.

Among the attempts by the Rishonim to construct such an interpretive framework, we note the following: First, Rabbi Yom Tov ben Avraham (Ritba) on Pesahim 51a says our Mishnah speaks of the case where something is clearly permitted, but a community wants to impose on itself a stringency; in that case, a person who comes to that town must observe that stringency, even if he intends to return to his home, so as to avoid dispute, and the double-stringency rule would apply to such a visitor. Ritba regards the case of Rabbah bar Bar Hanah as a different type of custom—where people adopt an observance whose legal basis rests on reasoned judgment (shikul ha-da’at), possibly bordering on error, even though the matter is not so clear. In such a case, the visitor would not be bound by local custom.

Second, Rabbi Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri (Bet Ha-Behirah on Pesahim 51a and in concise form in Bet Ha-Behirah on Hullin 18b) has a different way of squaring all the texts: the double stringency affects someone who intends to return to his home but will stay in the other locality more than thirty days. If he stays fewer than thirty days, then the customs of the new place do not affect him. If he intends to stay in the new place, then the customs of his old home no longer affect him. But note that Meiri excludes observance of the second day of Yom Tov from this whole framework, since it is a universal custom and should be observed by all visitors, no matter what their intentions.

Third, Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet (Responsa Ha-Rashba vol. 1 #337) has a different explanation, which avoids all the distinctions between different types of customs. In his view the plain sense of the language of the Mishnah allows no such distinctions. If the two places are of the same status (e.g., within the land of Israel or within Babylonia), then the double-stricture rule applies. Someone coming from the land of Israel to Babylonia with the intent to return would not have to observe the strictures of the Babylonians (as in the case of Rabbah bar Bar Hanah), since the land of Israel community is of higher status (and thus presumably someone observing Israeli customs would not cause dispute).

Other attempts to fit all the data into some comprehensive framework can be found in the commentaries of the earlier and later authorities. See, for example, the commentaries of Ran (Rabbenu Nissim), Ha-Ma’or Ha-Gadol of Rabbi Zerahiah Ha-Levi, and the Milhamot Hashem of Nahmanides, all on the Hilkhot Ha-Rif of Rabbi Yitzhak Alfasi, at the beginning of chapter 4 of Pesahim. In attempting to arrive at any legal decision on the matters under discussion in this responsum, the issue of the interpretive framework has important implications.

Following the usual rule that the law follows the latter authority, Rabbi Yitzhak Alfasi in his Halakhot notes that the law follows the opinion of Rav Ashi. Thus the principle of ”da’ato lahazor” (intent to return) becomes enshrined as law, and will take center stage in most subsequent analyses of this question.

The medieval and modern exegetes and decisors have made significant limitations in the rules set out in the Talmudic texts, with important implications for practical Halakhah, as we shall see. For the purposes of this responsum, we restrict our comments to some of the salient issues:

First, second day of Yom Tov as distinct—We mention first that a number of important medieval authorities (such as the Meiri cited above) exclude the second day of Yom Tov from the rules about visitors following or not following their own customs. See, for example, Ha-Maor Ha-Gadol of Rabbi Zerahiah Ha-Levi on Rif ch. 4 of Pesahim: “Those who came from the west [i.e., Israel] are forbidden to do work on the second day of Yom Tov in a town even if they intend to return, because this is a major custom that has spread to the entire Diaspora and it should not be breached.” As a universal custom observed throughout the Diaspora, the second day of Yom Tov has a special status; hence, according to this view, even temporary visitors from the land of Israel should abide by it. See also the rather singular view of Rabbi Yosef Rosen of Dvinsk (the Rogachover) in his commentary Tzafenat Pa’ne’ah on Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yom Tov chapter 8, Halakhah 20.

Another interesting, if cryptic, source that calls into question the relevance of all the Talmudic and subsequent discussion on the rules about “one who goes from place, etc.” is the Sefer Maharil, Hilkhot Issur ve-Heter (edition of S. Spitzer, Jerusalem 1989, pp. 527-528 and notes there), which recounts that Rabbi Ya’akov Moellin, known as the Maharil, allowed yeshiva students from other cities to eat meat slaughtered according to the more lenient custom of Mainz, since according to Mordekhai (Spitzer cites as the source Mordekhai on Yevamot par. 4, but see the printed text there, which differs considerably and does not say explicitly what Maharil says here) in our time we are no longer experts in matters of “strictures of the place whence he came and strictures of place to which he has come.” On the surface at least, this seems a strange comment to come from the classic collector of Ashkenazi customs. See the Magen Avraham on Orah Hayyim 468:12, who is similarly perplexed by the Maharil’s use of “we are no longer experts,” and tries to resolve the difficulty. (The use of the concept of “we are no longer experts on…” deserves a full study in its own right. For the present, see the fine introductory article of Rabbi Wayne Allen, “Jewish Law and Changing Times: Some Guidelines for Conflict Resolution,” in J.L. Romm and L. Levy, eds., Halakhah and the Modern Jew—Essays in Honor of Horace Bier, 1989, pp. 1-8.

Second, “da’ato lahazor”—The main tendency in the later literature is to place a number of limitations on the controlling concept of “da’ato lahazor,” the intention to return to one’s original home. In one way or another, later authorities go beyond one’s mental intention, even if expressed verbally, to add various litmus tests of that intention. Do one’s actions belie one’s stated intent? Do circumstances—political, economic, or otherwise—make it impossible or unlikely to carry out that intention, no matter how well-meaning? Does the concept of intention to return have any time limit, or is it open-ended? My honored teacher, Professor J. Faur, once mentioned to me in a critical way a person of his acquaintance from the land of Israel who arrived in America a short time after World War I. This man observed only one day of Yom Tov for some sixty years in the United States, since it was his ultimate intention to return! Clearly such an attitude takes the concept to absurd limits, but is there some upper limit?

On this whole issue, perhaps the most influential responsum has been that of Rabbi David Shlomo ben Avi Zimra (Radbaz) (Responsa part 4 #1148[73]), who says that a visitor may not follow the leniencies of the place from where he came unless he intends to return right away. What is the definition of “right away”? Radbaz maintains that if a person comes to Egypt to do business, then despite his intentions it is not clear when he will return to the land of Israel, if at all, since attractive business opportunities might well induce him to remain in the new place. If a person comes with his wife and family, then even if he intends to return, we regard him as if he intends to stay in Egypt, since he has in effect settled there. Otherwise, the whole notion of “da’ato lahazor” becomes an absurdity. After all, says Radbaz, all Jews in Egypt intend to settle in the land of Israel eventually and regard their living in Egypt as a temporary sojourn; otherwise, how could they justify living in a land that the Torah says not to return to? The views of Radbaz would become the starting point for discussion of the issue of intent to return in the works of most rabbis in subsequent generations.

Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the language of the question posed to Radbaz, which notes how in Egypt a problem had arisen of disregard of the second day of Yom Tov, with certain individuals excusing their behavior by claiming (falsely) that they were from the land of Israel. One wonders if this affected Radbaz’s ruling in the direction of greater strictness. The problem of fraudulent claims of “Israeliness” popped up on other occasions in Egyptian Jewry. See Rabbi Avraham ben Mordekhai Halevi, Responsa Ginat Veradim, Orah Hayyim Kelal 4 #14 (printer’s error shows it as 12), who complains of young men who take a “short cut” though the land of Israel on their way abroad to find a bride and suddenly stop observing the second day of Yom Tov, something that no rabbi allowed. He also cites the decision confirmed by several leading rabbis that young men who come to the land of Israel for the “Zayyara” (a long circuit of pilgrimages to the graves of famous rabbis) must observe two days of Yom Tov during their visit, and there is no difference between married men and single men in this matter.

A number of recent authorities attempted to limit Radbaz’s ruling that the presence of one’s wife on a trip automatically negated any claim of one’s intention to return. Thus Rabbi Moshe Feinstein in his Responsa Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim part 3 #72, 74, effectively limits Radbaz’s limitation on the original Talmudic rule. Traveling today is not such a big undertaking, and if the reason for the trip is for a well-defined occasion (e.g., to attend the wedding of a child) and the couple maintains their household in Israel and have no intention at all to settle in America, they would observe only one day of Yom Tov at least for private matters. But Rabbi Feinstein also states that to avoid conflict, they should attend the second Seder, just not say the blessings. He also works this ruling the opposite way, i.e., a person who spends several years in Israel with his wife but does not intend to settle there, or has not made up his mind, should observe two days of Yom Tov. See the similar ruling of Rabbi Ovadiah Hadaya in Responsa Ve-Dover Shalom #11, that for a short trip made explicitly for the purpose of a family visit even Radbaz himself would agree that the Israeli visitors should observe only one day of Yom Tov, at least in private.

In another of his responsa (Responsa Yaskil Avdi, vol. 1, Orah Hayyim #14), Rabbi Hadaya deals with people who left the land of Israel because of the outbreak of World War I and the resultant difficult conditions in the land. Some time later the Turkish authorities barred the return to the land of many Jewish former inhabitants who were subjects of belligerent powers. His conclusion was that with all their intentions to return, here it was impossible to return, so these people should observe the second day of Yom Tov.

Third, time limits of maintaining one’s original custom in a new place—The most controversial question is whether a person who intends to return to his or her original home could maintain the customs of that home over an extended time period. The only early source that would permit this is a Geonic responsum cited in B.M. Lewin, Otsar Ha-Geonim on Pesahim, par. 175, p. 72, which we cite here in full: “Those sons of Africa who married women in the land of Israel and dwell there, but have not been there yet for twelve months, must observe two days of Yom Tov as in their original home, for the Sages have taught: how long should a person be in a city and be like the people of the city?—twelve months. If they have stayed there twelve months, from then on, even if they intend to return [i.e., to Africa], they behave like the people of Jerusalem until they return to their place. This refers to those who come from Africa to the land of Israel, but from Babylonia, which has the two yeshivot, to the land of Israel, if he intends to return, even though he has stayed many years [in the land of Israel], he follows the strictures of both places. If he does not intend to return, he follows the custom of the land of Israel, whether more lenient or more strict.” While this responsum does allow for a long-term observance of the customs of one’s home, its relevance is in doubt, since it speaks of the Babylonian community, which enjoys a special status among Diaspora communities. Would our communities today have the status of Babylonia, or of “Africa”?

The other source often cited regarding long-term observance of one’s home custom is Rabbi Avraham Gombiner, Magen Avraham on Orah Hayyim 468, par. 12, citing the view of Maharil (mentioned above), who discussed yeshiva students observing the strictures of the places from where they came. Magen Avraham presumes that these students went away from home for two or three years, nevertheless they are still considered those who intend to return (da’ato lahazor).

The most recent source that allows maintaining an “Israeli” halakhic identity for a long-term stay is Rabbi Menasheh Klein in his Responsa Mishneh Halakhot vol. 4 #83, who deals with the question of a representative of an Israeli firm sent to its American branch for three years. Rabbi Klein is aware of the view of Rabbi Yekhiel Mikhel Epstein, Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 496:5, who places a limit of twelve months. He questions the basis of this limit, citing Magen Avraham’s interpretation of Maharil as a good example of the unlimited view, plus a few other sources from the responsa literature. Rabbi Klein expresses the novel view that as long as he has a set date for return, then one can still be considered as an inhabitant of the land of Israel who “intends to return.” This status would last as long as one does not pass that set date, even more so if his wife did not accompany him. However, even if his wife came with him, the ruling of Radbaz would not apply. He bases this opinion on Rabbi Hizkiyahu DeSilva, Peri Hadash on Orah Hayyim 468, that here is a different case, since this person did not come to the Diaspora to find work, but was sent by his firm in Israel, and his whole livelihood is connected to Israel even during his Diaspora stay, and depends on his returning at the end of three years.

Opposing this view we find a much larger number of authorities who put strict time limits on allowing a visitor to maintain the customs of his or her home. We mention first the view of Rabbi Epstein, Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 496:5, who says that an Israeli who plans to stay in the Diaspora for more than a year, even if he intends to return to Israel, must observe the second day of Yom Tov like the Diaspora Jews, which means reciting the holiday prayers, holding a second Seder, and all the rest of the holiday observances. This view is also adopted by Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef in his Responsa Yehaveh Da’at vol. 3 #35. An almost identical question to that put to Rabbi Menasheh Klein (discussed above) was asked of Rabbi Mordekhai Ya’akov Breisch (Responsa Helkat Ya’akov #145), who ruled that the representative of an Israeli firm sent abroad must observe two days of Yom Tov. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein ruled similarly with regard to an Israeli who married a Diaspora woman, who intended to stay in the Diaspora for two years (Responsa Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim par. 4 #108). See also the close analysis of this issue in Responsa Avnei Nezer, Orah Hayyim #424, who rejects the view of Magen Avraham, and Rabbi Ya’akov Emden, Responsa She’elat Yavetz part 1 #168, who decides that fundraisers for the poor of the land of Israel who spend long spells in the Diaspora must follow the strictures of the Diaspora even in private and cannot be considered “da’ato lahazor” in this matter even if it is clear to them and to us that they intend to return, and “even if, God forbid, all the inhabitants of the land of Israel were to return here, they do not have the power to be lenient on this matter even in private if they do not intend to return immediately.” In his Responsa Eretz Tzvi #42, Rabbi Aryeh Leib Frommer rejects applying the status of “da’ato lahazor” to someone who came from Israel to Poland and stayed for more than six years.

Fourth, short-term visits to the Diaspora—A clear consensus exists that short-term Israeli visitors to the Diaspora are not bound by the customs of the Diaspora Jews, and may observe their own customs in private (as in the stories concerning Rabbah bar Bar Hanah in Pesahim 51a and Rami bar Tamri in Hullin 110a). In public, however, they should not do anything that differs with local custom and might arouse dispute. Thus, for instance, a visiting Israeli should put on tefillin at home before going to the synagogue of the eighth day of Passover, which for him is a regular weekday. He should wear holiday garb. In the prayers he should recite the weekday Amidah (since this is recited silently, it is considered in private). If the second day of Yom Tov falls on Friday, he need not make an eruv tavshilin in order to cook for Shabbat. At a second Seder, he should not recite the Kiddush or other blessings connected to the Seder. If he is alone on that evening, he need not make a Seder. See, for example, Hayyei Adam 103:4.

While there is general agreement that the visiting Israeli may observe his customs in private, serious difference of opinion exist regarding the performing of melakhah (forbidden types of labor) on the second day of Yom Tov, even in private. Most influential in this regard has been the view of Tosafot (Pesahim 52a s.v. ba-yishuv la avdinan), who say that even in private and even if one intends to return, he still may not perform melakhah, because unlike other things, melakhah can never be kept entirely private. Like Tosafot, Ran on Pesahim ch. 4 s.v. ve-Rabbah bar Bar Hanah [at end of paragraph], also opines that work, as opposed to eating, cannot be kept entirely private, using as his source the same story of Rav Safra from Pesahim 51b-52a. His second explanation considerably lessens the general implications of the story, by saying that Rav Safra’s type of work was particularly well known, hence it was impossible for him to do work and keep the matter private (but presumably others could perform melakhah in private, if they intended to return to the land of Israel). Combining the view of Tosafot with the view of Rabbi Zerahiah Ha-levi (cited above), Radbaz (Responsa part 4 #1148[73]) deduces that those who come from the land of Israel to Egypt are not allowed to perform melakhah even in private once they arrive in a town where it is customary to refrain from working (as on the eve of Passover). Regarding melakhah on the second day of Yom Tov, Radbaz believes it is always forbidden, whether one intends to return to the land of Israel or not. Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan, Mishnah Berurah, Orah Hayyim 468:17, follows the view of Tosafot. See also the discussion of Rabbi DeSilva, Peri Hadash on Orah Hayyim 496, who finds that though the majority of Rishonim would allow doing melakhah in private, he nevertheless advises to follow the stricter views. Among those who prohibit performing melakhah in private we find Rabbi Gombiner, Magen Avraham on Orah Hayyim 496:4.

This strict view is not universal. Among those who permit doing melakhah in private we find Rabbi David Halevi, Taz on Orah Hayyim 496:2, who cites Rabbi Shlomo Luria in Yam Shel Shlomo, Beitzah ch. 1, par. 8. But see also Yam Shel Shlomo, Hullin ch. 8, par. 53, in which he tells the story of a Polish Jew who settled in the land of Israel, then returned for a visit some years later and who acted (presumably in public) on the second day of Yom Tov as if it were a regular weekday, was chastised for it, and mocked those who criticized him, who “died a strange death and never got to return to the land of Israel.” In his Responsa Avkat Rokhel #26, Rabbi Yosef Karo makes no distinction between melakhah and other activities performed in private by temporary visitors (cf. Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayyim 496:3). So seems to be the view of Maimonides in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yom Tov 8:20. Rabbi Epstein, Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 496:4, cites views on both sides, and regards the stricter view as decisive. So too posit the Kaf Ha-Hayyim, Orah Hayyim 496:3, and Birkei Yosef on Orah Hayyim 496:3, who cites the permissive views, but finds in favor of the stricter opinions.

Fifth, temporary visitors to Israel—The most lenient view is that of Rabbi Tzvi Ashkenazi (Responsa Hakham Tzvi #167), who says that even temporary visitors to the land of Israel observe only one day of Yom Tov. According to his novel reasoning, the rule of “strictures of place whence came and to which he has come” applies only to stringent customs that, at least potentially, someone could observe in any locality. The second day of Yom Tov could not be observed by an inhabitant of the land of Israel, since one would be adding on to a Torah commandment, which is forbidden. Hence observance of the second day of Yom Tov does not fall within the ruling of our Mishnah in Pesahim (see Shulhan Arukh Ha-Rav, Orah Hayyim 496:11, and Responsa Shoel U-Meishiv 3:2:28, who support this view; the Hakham Tzvi’s son, Rabbi Ya’akov Emden, disagrees, however—see Responsa She’elet Yavetz vol. 1, #168). The standard view, however, was set out by Rabbi Yosef Karo in Responsa Avkat Rokhel #26, in which he cites the long-standing custom for visitors to observe two days of Yom Tov and to have their own minyan. On the surface at least, holding a public separate minyan of Diaspora Jews would seem to violate the rule of doing in private any deviation from local custom so as to avoid conflict. Evidently, says Rabbi Karo, the sages of the land of Israel regarded prayer as not threatening any conflict, and hence did not say anything when Diaspora Jews had their own minyan.

Rabbi Hayyim David Azulai, Responsa Tov Ayin #14, disagrees, however. See also Rabbi Tzvi Pesah Frank, Responsa Har Tzvi, Orah Hayyim #70, who rules that an Israeli may participate in a minyan made up of Jews from the Diaspora reading the holiday Torah portion on the second day of Yom Tov that falls on a Shabbat. The following authorities rule like Rabbi Karo: Mishnah Berurah, Orah Hayyim 496:13; Pe’at Ha-Shulhan 2:15; Responsa Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim vol. 3 #74; vol. 4 #108. It is interesting to note that Rabbi Hayyim Elazar Shapira of Munkatsch refused to stay in Israel for Shavu’ot, as he was unsure which position to follow (Responsa Minhat Elazar vol. 3, #59).

There is also a middle position, which attempts to balance the opinions of both Rabbi Karo and the Hakham Tzvi. This view essentially agrees with the Hakham Tzvi that only one day of observance is necessary, but to play it safe requires one to be strict like Rabbi Karo. This is known in common parlance as observing “a day and a half.” This opinion requires one to refrain from performing any melakhah, or eating hametz on the eighth day of Passover, yet dictates that one should say the weekday prayers and put on tefillin. This view is ascribed to Rabbi Shmuel Salant (see Rabbi Y. Fried, Yom Tov Sheni Ke-hilkhato, p. 107, note 2; see Responsa Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim vol. 3, #73 for a discussion of this view). This is also purported to be the view of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik (see Reshimot Shiurim—Massekhet Sukkah of Rabbi Soloveitchik by Rabbi Tzvi Reichman and footnote in the back by Rabbi Moshe Meiselman; it is said that Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein also concurs that Rabbi Soloveitchik held this compromise position).

Some authorities have decided that bachelors who come to the land of Israel to study Torah should observe only one day of Yom Tov. See Rabbi Hayyim Mordekhai Margoliot, Sha’arei Teshuvah on Orah Hayyim 496:2, and Rabbi Hayyim David Halevi, Mekor Hayyim Ha-Shalem, ch. 198, par. 47, vol. 4, p. 165. The presumption here is that these young men will be offered appropriate matches and will stay on. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, however, in Responsa Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim vol. 2 #101, maintains that a yeshiva student still financially dependent on his parents in the Diaspora, who could presumably tell him to return to the Diaspora, is still regarded as a Diaspora Jew. See the polemical Ma’aneh La-Iggerot #76 of Rabbi Yom Tov Schwartz, which challenges Rabbi Feinstein’s view and offers some interesting sociological comments on the relative independence of yeshiva students in different eras.

Conclusion

On the basis of the above analysis and the literature there cited, we conclude:

1. Israeli Jews staying in the Diaspora for longer than twelve months, even if they intend to return to Israel, must observe the second day of Yom Tov like Diaspora Jews (Responsa Yehaveh Da’at, vol. 3  #35; Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 496).
2. Israeli Jews on short-term visits to the Diaspora, who intend to return to Israel, should behave according to Israeli custom in private on the second day of Yom Tov (e.g., regarding tefillin and prayers), but in public should do nothing that differs from local custom. Regarding performing melakhah in private, the majority opinion of contemporary authorities would forbid it (Rabbi Y. Fried, Yom Tov Sheni Ke-hilkhato, ch. 3, par. 1 and notes therein), but the minority view, based on major figures of the Rishonim and Aharonim, is equally persuasive and may be relied on. However, we would recommend keeping such activities, even though private, to an absolute minimum (see Responsa Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 4 #83, at end of responsum). On the eighth day of Passover, the Israeli on a temporary visit may not eat hametz, even in private. Any hametz stored in his home that he had sold to a gentile would not be returned to his ownership until after the eighth day, and any other hametz he would have to acquire in public would be forbidden.
3. On the second day of Yom Tov, the Israeli on a temporary visit to the Diaspora should not be called up to the Torah, should not lead the prayers, and should not go up to pronounce the priestly benediction (Responsa Hayyim She’al #13; Responsa Halakhot Ketanot vol. 1, #4; Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 496:5).
4. A Diaspora Jew who settles in Israel (with the intention to stay) immediately begins observing only one day of Yom Tov (Arukh Ha-Shulhan, Orah Hayyim 496:5). The decision to settle alone is not sufficient to change one’s status in this matter, and must be backed up by the act of settling in the land of Israel (Responsa Iggerot Moshe, Orah Hayyim vol. 4 #108).
5. Diaspora Jews on a temporary visit to Israel must observe two days of Yom Tov.

For further details, consult the handbooks cited above, especially that of Rabbi Y. Fried, and the sources mentioned there.

Wherever we may live, let us pray that we may always have the inspiration to make the festival days true Yamim Tovim, as “the fixed times of the Lord, which you shall proclaim as sacred occasions” (Lev. 23:2).