{"id":3213,"date":"2022-12-11T12:36:37","date_gmt":"2022-12-11T17:36:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/?p=3213"},"modified":"2022-12-12T09:02:24","modified_gmt":"2022-12-12T14:02:24","slug":"what-is-the-problem-with-baruch-spinoza","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/2022\/12\/what-is-the-problem-with-baruch-spinoza\/","title":{"rendered":"What is the Problem With Baruch Spinoza?"},"content":{"rendered":"

In an ongoing\u00a0shi\u2019ur\u00a0<\/em>[study session] dealing with the\u00a0Halakhic<\/em>\u00a0status of the\u00a0mumar<\/em>, or the\u00a0meshummad<\/em>, the Jew who has willingly and intentionally chosen not to be Torah compliant, I cited as examples Baruch Spinoza and Mordecai M. Kaplan. A learned attendee posed a challenge from Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo, an Orthodox rabbi who found a spiritual purity in Spinoza\u2019s probing individualism. At\u00a0https:\/\/www.cardozoacademy.org\/thoughtstoponder\/the-latest-controversy-around-spinoza\/<\/a>, R. Cardozo outlines what he believes to be Spinoza\u2019s enduring contribution to contemporary Jewish thought and life:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Cardozo flirted with heresy before becoming an Orthodox rabbi. He was, and remains, a spiritually restless seeker. He finds in heresy the challenging notion that in a secular, pluralist world, both belief and heresy are unavoidable choices. The classical Jewish tradition does not stifle conscience-driven dissent, as evidenced by Abraham\u2019s challenging God, \u201cwill You put an end to the righteous along with the wicked [regarding the impending destruction of Sodom and \u2018Amora],<\/a>[1]<\/a>and Moses\u2019 objection to the collective punishment of Israel after the Qorah incident, \u201c[is it appropriate that when \u201cone man sins, You (= God) become frothy [in rage] with the entire people?\u201d<\/a>[2]<\/a>\u00a0Spinoza provides a model for questioning religion, for R. Cardozo.<\/li>\n
  2. Cardozo neither hides nor denies his own heretical autobiographical experience; his secular and Orthodox intellectual encounters provided him with the dialectic disposition to test and refine his own faith. For R. Cardozo, religious doubt properly and maturely framed and constructively directed may lead to a more perfect and mature faith grounded on truth.<\/li>\n
  3. For R. Cardozo, authentic Orthodoxy is not a crutch for the comfortable; it is a goad to guide the seeker to goodness.<\/li>\n
  4. While R. Cardozo affirms his Orthodoxy without apology, R. Cardozo still finds beauty and elegance in Spinoza\u2019s geometric construction and regards Spinoza the person to be a \u201csecular tzaddik,\u201d a term that rings oxymoronic to some if not most Orthodox readers.<\/li>\n
  5. Cardozo is not blind to Spinoza\u2019s shortcomings. He finds in Spinoza\u2019s thought an intellectual arrogance, and that Spinoza\u2019s thought is too spiritually vague to be lived in historical reality. R. Cardozo also affirms that Hebrew Scripture cannot and may not be read as a mere human cultural artifact. Scripture is not just\u00a0descriptive<\/em>literature; it must be\u00a0heard<\/em>\u00a0as God\u2019s normative\u00a0prescription\u00a0<\/em>for Israel and for humankind.<\/em>\u00a0The secular Spinoza reads the Torah as a book, with the emotional distance and detachment of a third person remoteness; the engaged Orthodox Torah student hears the Torah talking to her or him with an intimate second person direct address to a \u201cyou,\u201d or more precisely, like the French second person familiar, \u201ctu<\/em>.\u201d Put differently, Spinoza needs to see in order to believe, but he is apparently deaf to the Scriptural God\u2019s call to the Scripture\u2019s readers. And R. Cardozo believes in order to see, as one who is open to creativity, innovation, and discovery.<\/li>\n
  6. Cardozo suggests that Maimonides\u2019 rationalism may have anticipated and even contributed to Spinoza\u2019s heresy and that Judaism does not entertain catechistic dogmas. However, this bold claim is debatable and requires clarification. R. Cardozo contends that Maimonides\u2019 catechism was actually harmful to Judaism. In support of R. Cardozo\u2019s claim are the facts that Maimonides\u2019 thirteen faith principles were not [1] accepted by all Israel or [2] by any\u00a0Bet Din ha-Gadol<\/em>, or Jewish religious supreme court that is authorized to issue normative, apodictic legislation that obligates all of Jewry.<\/a>[3]<\/a>Furthermore, [3] Maimonides\u2019 positions have been hotly contested by other Rabbinic voices.<\/a>[4]<\/a>\u00a0But R. Cardozo\u2019s claim that in fact there are no Jewish dogmas will not likely resonate to most contemporary Orthodox adherents, for the following reasons. Even conceding that Maimonides is not the only normative voice regarding required Jewish belief, the Oral Torah memorialized<\/a>[5]<\/a>\u00a0the\u00a0legal<\/em>\u00a0norm that maintains that a Jew who in a speech act denies that God will raise the dead to renewed life or that God is the Author of the Torah has forfeited his\/her portion in the eternity to come.<\/a>[6]<\/a>\u00a0On one hand, merely denying the divinity of the Torah or the resurrection of the dead in one\u2019s mind, without verbally articulating that thought, might reasonably be considered to be a case of \u201cno foul,\u201d no penalty because what is formally forbidden by the legislated norm is the speech, not just the thought. This being said, these two doctrinal legal norms clearly imply three faith assertions, [1] that the God Who is revealed in and by Scripture is real, and not a mere contrived, semantic construction, [2] this God does communicate to humankind, which is most often done through the medium of prophecy. Recall that God told Moses to appear before Pharaoh as an\u00a0E-lohim<\/em>, a Canaanite\u00a0ilu<\/em>, or a \u201cdivinity\u201d capable of generating an oracle, and Aaron would act as his speaker, that is his\u00a0nabi<\/em>. [3] Last, this singular and only God holds humanity to account with regard to compliance with His word, demand, and command. And these three doctrines are Judaism\u2019s\u00a0functional<\/em>\u00a0dogmas according to R. Joseph Albo\u2019s\u00a0Sefer ha-\u2019Iqqarim<\/em>,<\/a>[7]<\/a>\u00a0the prerequisite beliefs which ground Hebrew Scripture\u2019s theological coherency.<\/a>[8]<\/a><\/li>\n
  7. Cardozo\u2019s critique of Maimonides\u2019 theological requirements is not unique to him. For Maimonides, R. Hillel would be considered to be a heretic because he believed that the Messiah already arrived in the time of King Hezeqiah\u2014and ought not to be expected in the future.<\/a>[9]<\/a> Albo believes, to my mind correctly, that R. Hillel is in theological error, but, Heaven forfend, R. Hillel should\u00a0not<\/em>be condemned as an apostate. This assertion is justified by the fact that R. Hillel retains his rabbinic honorific\u00a0in spite<\/em>\u00a0of his error,<\/a>[10]<\/a>\u00a0unlike Elisha b. Avuya, who rejected the Torah\u2019s commandments and the Commander\u2019s authority altogether,<\/a>[11]<\/a>\u00a0whose honorific \u201crabbi\u201d title has been forfeited. Similarly, Raabad\u2019s observation that Maimonides\u2019 claim that believing that the Scriptural God may become flesh [=incarnation] is a heresy cannot be sustained because \u201cbigger and better\u201d authorities<\/a>[12]<\/a>\u00a0than Maimonides, like R. Moshe Taqu in\u00a0Ketav Tammim<\/a>[13]<\/a><\/em>\u00a0and perhaps even Rashi<\/a>[14]<\/a>,\u00a0believed that the all-powerful God may indeed appear as a body. Maimonides\u2019 detractors had an even better argument, that unlike the canonical mSanhedrin\u00a0<\/em>10:1, there is in no Oral Torah legislation that I could locate a norm forbidding maintaining this supposedly incorrect belief. Nor is there any evidence that Hebrew Scripture requires of Israel any catechistic affirmations beyond love and trust in God and compliance with God\u2019s law.<\/a>[15]<\/a>\u00a0Furthermore, God is described in Scripture has having an eye,<\/a>[16]<\/a>\u00a0hand,<\/a>[17]<\/a>\u00a0nose,<\/a>[18]<\/a>\u00a0forearm,<\/a>[19]<\/a>\u00a0face,<\/a>[20]<\/a>\u00a0and finger.<\/a>[21]<\/a>\u00a0While a hyper literalist reading of Scripture may be exegetically and theologically inappropriate, the absence of an explicit Oral Torah norm designating that belief to be heretical\u2014and therefore forbidden\u2014is sufficient to exonerate those who maintain these problematic beliefs.<\/li>\n
  8. Cardozo\u2019s lucid and succinct explanation of Spinoza\u2019s epistemology expresses a deep and sincere respect for Spinoza the man and mind. However, Cardozo rightly objects to Spinoza\u2019s caricature of Oral Torah Judaism, which he attributes to Spinoza\u2019s lack of exposure to Talmudic literature and thought as not experiencing a personal social emersion in a vibrant, Jewish thick culture. In other words, from a culture horizon perspective three and a half centuries after Spinoza\u2019s time, R. Cardozo believes that the Amsterdam Jewish community\u2019s ban on Spinoza should now be rescinded. He writes:<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
    \n

    The fact that Spinoza was dead wrong about some crucial matters and that philosophy has moved far beyond his ideas does not detract from his or his books\u2019 merits. I consider him [i.e. Spinoza] a secular tzaddik. He lived by his noble ideas, was dedicated to simplicity, and showed the most remarkable virtuous characteristics. That these were accompanied by intellectual arrogance does not minimize his nobility. In many ways he reminds me of the great mussar personalities \u2013 Jewish religious and ethical teachers in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe.<\/a>[22]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    Cardozo\u2019s position is only possible\u2014and intelligible\u2014in modernity. For Orthodox teachers of all stripes, the notion of \u201csecular tzaddik\u201d is oxymoronic. I suspect that R. Cardozo found in Spinoza\u2019s system a highly principled outlook, a sort of secular piety, which he may not personally adopt but is able to appreciate from a distance. After all, a wise person is open to learn from everybody and anybody.<\/a>[23]<\/a>\u00a0But he then adds,<\/p>\n

    \n

    In spite of Spinoza\u2019s lofty ideas in the Ethics, it became clear to me that in his Tractatus Theologico Politicus<\/a>\u00a0he was misrepresenting Judaism in ways that were most disturbing. For some of this, he could not be blamed. But it became evident that several of his misrepresentations were clearly deliberate and against his better knowledge. This shocked me to the core.<\/a>[24]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    Spinoza names his God \u201cSubstance.\u201d<\/a>[25]<\/a>\u00a0This term refers to everything and, as a consequence, means nothing. And Mordecai M. Kaplan\u2019s God, \u201cthe power that makes for salvation,\u201d<\/a>[26]<\/a>\u00a0reflects the perceived need of a non-believer to adopt a stance of \u201cinnocence of association\u201d by affirming a \u201cGod concept\u201d in order to sell a social construction to a target population.<\/a>[27]<\/a><\/p>\n

    Hakham Professor<\/em>\u00a0Jose Faur argues that the historical Spinoza is imagining<\/p>\n

    \n

    a self-contained and categorically autonomous universe. By insisting on a totally homogonous universe, Spinoza denied religion its traditional arguments. Thus Spinoza not only freed the mind from the authority of religion, he also broke the grid \u201cChurch-State,\u201d ushering in a new era, that of secularism.<\/a>[28]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

    For Prof. Faur, Spinoza, was the first secular Jew, who on one hand abandoned Judaism but nevertheless chose not to adopt Christianity, on the other.<\/a>[29]<\/a>\u00a0He adopted the\u00a0converso<\/em>\u00a0ideology which alienated its victims\u00a0from<\/em>\u00a0Judaism, the oppressed religion, but could, would, and did not allow him adopt the religion of the oppressor,<\/a>[30]<\/a>\u00a0the Church of Rome. As such, Spinoza became the model of modern secularism.<\/p>\n

    According to Prof. Faur, Spinoza\u2019s leaving the Jewish people must be seen as a betrayal of the Jewish people, and for him, Spinoza is no hero. But there is a critical difference between the historical Spinoza who is a product of a bygone age, with its unique time horizon, the dawn of modernity, with its ethos and challenges. R. Cardozo\u2019s Spinoza is a very different persona and construct. Recalling that R. Cardozo confessed that he himself was first a heretic who eventually became an Orthodox rabbi, his \u201cheresy\u201d moved him to reconsider the challenges of and problems with unbelief. By experiencing both belief\u00a0and<\/em>\u00a0unbelief over the course of his life, R. Cardozo understands both positions but only affirms the former. It is no accident that the word heresy stems from a root meaning \u201cto make a choice.\u201d<\/a>[31]<\/a>\u00a0In modernity, belief is ultimately a choice, and not a foregone fact determined by social inertia. By rehabilitating his constructed Spinoza, R. Cardozo extends the boundaries of social Orthodoxy in order to nurture an Orthodoxy that is inoculated with just enough heresy to create the defense immunity of a faith so strong that it resists faithlessness. Essentially, R. Cardozo\u2019s Spinoza seems to be a model for a big tent, inclusivist Orthodox Judaism that welcomes sincere reflection, integrity driven consciences, and a plurality of religiously authentic Orthodox positions.\u00a0<\/a>[32]<\/a><\/p>\n

    Cardozo\u2019s keen analytic eye candidly recognized that Spinoza was not always intellectually honest. Nevertheless, R. Cardozo maintains that doubters\u2019 questions reflect a sincere engagement of ideas and binding to the object of and in doubt. R. Cardozo\u2019s Orthodoxy regards the ultimate enemy of religion to be apathetic indifference, not the so-called \u201cheresy\u201d of doubt. After all, doubters are engaged and belong inside the Orthodox tent,<\/a>[33]<\/a>\u00a0while indifference keeps people from even considering religion and God\u2019s presence altogether.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[1]<\/a>\u00a0Genesis 18:23.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[2]<\/a>\u00a0Numbers 16:22. These are rhetorical questions, consistent with the Torah Covenant morality which obligates God as well as Israel.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[3]<\/a>\u00a0Ravina I and Rav Ashi were the last Amoraic sages who were authorized to issue\/legislate apodictic norms. bBava Metsi\u2019a\u00a0<\/em>86a.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[4]<\/a>\u00a0Notably, Nahmanides and the French School was strongly opposed to Maimonidean rationalism. See Jose Faur,\u00a0In the Shadow of History<\/em>:\u00a0Jews and Conversos at the Dawn of Modernity<\/em><\/a>\u00a0(Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1991), pp. 12-14. For full disclosure, the author is my\u00a0rav muvhaq<\/em>, the mentor who shaped my own Jewish world view.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[5]<\/a>\u00a0mSanhedrin\u00a0<\/em>10:1 is an uncontested canonical document that memorializes\u00a0Tannaitic<\/em>\u00a0rabbinic norms.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[6]<\/a>\u00a0\u201cWorld\u201d is the conventional but imprecise rendering of\u00a0\u2018olam\u2019<\/em>\u00a0in this context. The Mishnah\u2019s cited proof text, Isaiah 60:21,\u201d is actually cited not only as a prooftext, that being part of Israel is sufficient for vindication and justification, \u201cpossessing eternity forever. \u201c\u2019Arets\u201d\u00a0<\/em>here refers to the next world, as in Exodus 15:12, which likely refers to the netherworld, and the Lord will destroy \u201cDeath,\u201d in the intensive\u00a0pi\u2019el<\/em>\u00a0conjugation. See Isaiah 25:8 and\u00a0https:\/\/emp.byui.edu\/satterfieldb\/ugarit\/The%20Epic%20of%20Baal.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[7]<\/a>\u00a0Sefer ha-\u2018Iqqarim\u00a0<\/em>]1:1].<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[8]<\/a>\u00a0Psalms 10:4. 14:1, and 53:2.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[9]<\/a>\u00a0bSanhedrin 98b.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[10]<\/a>\u00a0Ibid.<\/em><\/p>\n

    <\/a>[11]<\/a>\u00a0pHagiga\u00a0<\/em>2:1 and bHagiga\u00a0<\/em>15b-16a. Upon consorting with a \u201clady of the evening,\u201d the illicit pleasure professional whom he approached gave him his unflattering knickname,\u00a0aher<\/em>, the \u201cother,\u201d as he was no longer a member of the Torah covenant community and unlike R. Hillel, forfeited his rabbinic honorific.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[12]<\/a>\u00a0Raabad, Objections to Maimonides,\u00a0Yad<\/em>\u00a0Compendium,\u00a0Teshuvah\u00a0<\/em>3:7.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[13]<\/a>\u00a0See\u00a0http:\/\/www.hashkafacircle.com\/journal\/R3_DS_Taku.pdf<\/a>. It may be that the idea of a corporeal \u201cGod\u201d was not foreign to French rabbis living in a theological world in which the \u201cincarnation\u201d was an important doctrine.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[14]<\/a>\u00a0https:\/\/hakirah.org\/Vol%207%20Slifkin.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[15]<\/a>\u00a0Ecclesiastes 12:13-14.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[16]<\/a>\u00a0Deuteronomy 11:12.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[17]<\/a>\u00a0Exodus 9:3.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[18]<\/a>\u00a0Deuteronomy 23:16.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[19]<\/a>\u00a0Exodus 7:6 and Deuteronomy 4:34.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[20]<\/a>\u00a0Genesis 19:13 and Exodus 32:11.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[21]<\/a>\u00a0Exodus 8:15.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[22]<\/a>\u00a0https:\/\/www.cardozoacademy.org\/thoughtstoponder\/the-latest-controversy-around-spinoza\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[23]<\/a>\u00a0mAvot<\/em>\u00a04:1.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[24]<\/a>\u00a0Ibid.<\/em><\/p>\n

    <\/a>[25]<\/a>\u00a0Benedict de Spinoza,\u00a0The Ethics<\/em><\/a>, at\u00a0<\/em>https:\/\/www.gutenberg.org\/files\/3800\/3800-h\/3800-h.htm<\/a>, 1:6-8.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[26]<\/a>\u00a0Conveniently at\u00a0https:\/\/kaplancenter.org\/?s=salvation<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[27]<\/a>\u00a0For Spinoza and Kaplan, God is not the Author of the Torah or the Commander of the Torah\u2019s commandments. For them, the Biblical and Rabbinic God is not real, but a God \u201cidea\u201d is required to justify a religious self-identity.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[28]<\/a>\u00a0Faur<\/a>, supra footnote 4, p. 142.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[29]<\/a>\u00a0Ibid.\u00a0<\/em>p. 143. See Maimonides,\u00a0Teshuva\u00a0<\/em>3:11, who regards separation from the Jewish people as a violation so odious that one who does separate from the Jewish people forfeits her\/his portion in the eternity to come.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[30]<\/a>\u00a0Ibid., pp.\u00a0<\/em>143-144. According to Prof. Faur, this ideology spawned the deism of the French \u201cEnlightenment.\u201d<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[31]<\/a>\u00a0From the Greek,\u00a0hairesis<\/em>.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[32]<\/a>\u00a0For example, see R. Gil Student\u2019s superb defense of interfaith relations with non-Jewish religions, while retaining Orthodox integrity, at https:\/\/www.torahmusings.com\/2022\/11\/rabbi-sacks-religious-pluralism-a-halakhic-and-hashkafic-defense\/?utm_source=Klaviyo&utm_medium=campaign&_kx=cFQsWk4OJ_Iki8jn7UABPYPFvqLTCwD4pG3Lmg45rRCEhw7od6sRZPrgJofUzVZi.L87CGh<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    <\/a>[33]<\/a>\u00a0At a lecture on the Passover seder, my REITS Rav Moshe D. Tendler reminded his students that the alienated son must be welcomed, with his questions, at the Seder. If the alienated child is not present at the seder, answers to his questions will be offered at far less congenial forums than the traditional Passover seder. He then argued that Yeshiva University\u00a0must\u00a0<\/em>teach Bible criticism to its undergraduates, if only in order to prepare and inoculate its graduates from unfriendly, adversarial challenges when competent, Orthodox mentors are not available.<\/p>\n\n

    <\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    In an ongoing\u00a0shi\u2019ur\u00a0[study session] dealing with the\u00a0Halakhic\u00a0status of the\u00a0mumar, or the\u00a0meshummad, the Jew who has willingly and intentionally chosen not to be Torah compliant, I cited as examples Baruch Spinoza and Mordecai M. Kaplan. A learned attendee posed a challenge from Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo, an Orthodox rabbi who found a spiritual purity in Spinoza\u2019s Continue Reading »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":3216,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[78,83],"tags":[],"coauthors":[86],"class_list":["post-3213","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-modern-judaism","category-philosophy"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3213","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3213"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3213\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3219,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3213\/revisions\/3219"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3216"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3213"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3213"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3213"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/utj.org\/viewpoints\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=3213"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}