by Rabbi Seth D. Gordon
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed here are that of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of the Union for Traditional Judaism, unless otherwise indicated.
Adults of a certain generation will remember one of Jack Benny’s most famous comedic scenes: A potential robber aims a gun at him with the question, “Your money or your life?” Benny hesitates, so the assailant impatiently asks him again. Benny explains his hesitation: “I’m thinking it over.”
The sketch played well because Benny had portrayed himself as a cheapskate. It is funny because the audience knows that money is meaningless when life is at stake. But have we been manipulated by our own conceptions into a false choice?
A relevant law from the Shulchan Aruch (YD 116:5) was recently circulated. (My translation): “A person should be careful about everything that brings him to danger, for danger is more severe than ritual prohibitions, and one should be more sensitive to a possible danger than a possible prohibition, so therefore it is forbidden to go to a place of danger, such as under an unstable wall or going out by oneself at night. So too it is forbidden to drink water from rivers at night or to drink from pipes directly with one’s mouth, for these things have a presumption of concern about danger. … In addition, they wrote that one should flee from a city when there is a plague and should leave when it begins, and not wait until the end. And all of these things are due to danger, and one who wants to preserve should distance himself from them and not rely on a miracle or to place his life in danger for these types.”
My writing here begins with a basic, and then somewhat deeper, survey of the danger issue. The learned may find certain parts “aleph-bet,” but the general reader needs to know the foundations, and as a pulpit rabbi they are my primary concern. Others may nevertheless find the specific sources to be useful. In the last section, I will offer a different perspective.
In deference to those who cannot read the Hebrew or Aramaic texts, I have translated all sources into English but retained key rabbinic terms that I both transliterate and translate.
I make the following arguments from halachah, from the teaching and the specific words themselves, and from a combination that I have not admittedly seen, and from reason:
Danger to Life
I begin by citing what many know and celebrate about Torah teaching: We are commanded to cherish life and safeguard against injury and danger to life.
וְעָשִׂיתָ מַעֲקֶה לְגַגֶּךָ וְלֹא תָשִׂים דָּמִים בְּבֵיתֶךָ (Devarim / Deuteronomy 22:8) — “When you build a new house, you shall make a ma’akeh / parapet for your roof, so that you do not bring bloodguilt on your house if anyone should fall from it.” (NJPS) — Without resorting to d’rash (creative interpretation of a Biblical verse), as we will later see, the p’shat of the Torah here mandates a specific action, and the Sages regarded it as a mitzvah, a command. (RaMBaM counts it as mitzvah # 298.) This mitzvah was expanded in Rabbinic teaching to include proactive action to clear away obstacles which potentially could cause injury.
And yet, the Gemara (Hullin 136a) exempts synagogues and batei midrash (study halls) from the requirement? Why? Is danger not danger? We can speculate as to why they are exempt, but if danger was so all-encompassing, then why not include synagogues and batei midrash in the mitzvah requirements for the parapet? As this demonstrates, a general principle may have rational exceptions.
The primary area where danger overrides halachah is in ritual issues. Two talmudic teachings form the foundation:
This is not the place to address the three situations when Rabbinic teaching requires risking our lives rather than transgressing a mitzvah — when danger is subordinate to the mitzvah. Rather the point of emphasis here is that except for those three, including even Shabbat, for which the penalty is severe, Torah laws are subordinate to saving a life. I will note, to further sharpen the cutting power of this teaching, that neither the positive mitzvah to “honor father and mother” nor the mitzvah to “build the Mishkan” supersede the laws of Shabbat. Yet, as we see, a threat to life does!
We find several examples reflected in the principle: פיקוח נפש דוחה שבת / piku’ach nefesh docheh Shabbat / “saving life suspends (the laws of) Shabbat,” and as I would suggest the stronger manifestation and more practical use is ספק פיקוח נפש דוחה שבת / safek piku’ach nefesh docheh Shabbat “a (reasonable) doubt of saving life suspends (the laws of) Shabbat.” (Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:5)
That RaMBaM addressed this principle and the specific laws deduced from it in Chapter 2 of Hilchot Shabbat before teaching the Shabbat prohibitions, speaks volumes. I employ his code because it is well-organized and clear, unlike the teachings of our Sages which are scattered throughout the Talmud. These laws are, of course, well-known, but I emphasize not only the laws themselves, but the gradations: depending upon the illness, its severity, and who is in a position to deal with the suffering. In other words, judgment, guided by principle, is vital; invoking an unexamined general principle alone is worrisome. (Of course, we will not all agree.) I cite much of chapter 2, aware that it is lengthy, because the particulars are vital for a real appreciation of the issues.
In 2:1 RaMBaM succinctly summarizes the essence of the two aforementioned Talmudic passages and then incorporates the physician’s role: The [laws of] Shabbat are suspended in the face of danger to life, as are [the obligations of] the other mitzvot. Therefore, we may / must perform — according to the directives of a professional physician of that locale — everything that is necessary for the benefit of a sick person whose life is in danger.
He adds: “When there is a doubt whether or not the Shabbat laws must be violated on a person’s behalf, one should violate the Shabbat laws on his behalf, for the Shabbat laws are suspended even when there is merely a question of danger to a person’s life,” invoking the broader ספק פיקוח נפש דוחה שבת / safek piku’ach nefesh docheh Shabbat “a (reasonable) doubt of saving life suspends (the laws of) Shabbat” which I cited above. He continues: “[The same principles apply] when one physician says the Shabbat laws should be violated on a person’s behalf, and another physician says that this is not necessary.” In other words, doubt, not certainty, is the standard as to whether we suspend law under the threat of life.
In the second half of 2:2, doubt is extended to whether or not the danger is life threatening and he provides examples of what would ordinarily be violations: “As long as a person is dangerously [ill] — or even if there is a question whether he is dangerously [ill] — and requires treatment, [Shabbat] should be violated [on his behalf]. A lamp may be lit and / or extinguished on his behalf. [Animals] may be slaughtered on his behalf, [food] may be baked and cooked on his behalf, and water heated for him, whether to drink or to use for bathing.”
In 2:3, RaMBaM emphasizes that even the most esteemed rabbi should do what would be otherwise a violation, so that others do not take this principle lightly. He adds that “it is forbidden to hesitate before (what otherwise would be) transgressing Shabbat [laws] on behalf of a person who is dangerously ill, as reflected in the interpretation of the phrase, `which a person shall perform to live through them’ as `to live through them” and not “to die through them.’” It is only now that he invokes the supporting Torah verse and its rabbinic midrashic interpretation. He then adds that “Torah brings mercy, kindness, and peace to the world, not harshness,” and others who insist that Shabbat law overrides a threat to life are perverting Torah teaching.
In the subsequent laws — ailing eyes, wounds within one’s body, and many external wounds, as well as swallowing a leech or incurring a rabid dog’s bite or one from a venomous snake — are all under the category of a doubt to a threat to life — and Shabbat law is violated for them.
In 2:10 RaMBaM turns to a different category — those not dangerously ill. RaMBaM addresses the distinctions of what we may be able to do or not do and who may do them and who may not, but what defines “not life-threatening” may be presumed to be other than those he has listed. But surely, that is a judgment.
In 2:11 and in 2:13 RaMBaM (from Shabbat 128b) — includes a birthing mother as among those whose life is threatened — from after birth for three days. From the third to the seventh day, only if she insists that she does not require treatment should Shabbat laws not be violated on her behalf. In 2:14, specifics such as kindling a fire, even in the summer in the cold regions, is permitted, since cold is very difficult for a woman to bear after childbirth.
In 2:16 RaMBaM writes: “[All] activities necessary to save a life should be performed on Shabbat; there is no necessity to receive license from the court. The more zealous one is [in this regard], the more praiseworthy. How so? If one sees that a child has fallen into the sea one may spread out a net and hoist him up, although one catches fish together with him. If a person hears that a child fell into the sea and spreads out a net to hoist him up, but raises only fish, he is absolutely free of all liability …” and in 2:17 — “If a child fell into a pit, a person may dislodge a clod of earth and lift [the child] up, even though he creates a step when he dislodges it. If a door was locked with a child inside, a person may break the door down and take the child out, even though he chops it into pieces of wood which are appropriate to use for work, lest the child be frightened and die.” He continues: “If a fire broke out and a person is inside the building and we fear that he may be consumed by the flames, a person may extinguish the fire to save him … Whoever acts first to save him is praiseworthy. One does not need to ask permission from the court in all instances when there is a danger to a person’s life.” And in 2:18 — “When an avalanche has fallen, and there is a doubt whether or not it has fallen over a person, it may be cleared. If the person is discovered to be alive, but was crushed [by the fallen debris], to the extent that it is possible that he will recover, [the debris] may be cleared and the person taken out to enable him to live [however] long he does.”
There is another relevant area of concern about potential danger: brit milah (circumcision). RaMBaM Hilchot Milah 1:18 writes: A woman, who has had two children die from milah, it does not matter whether the children were born from different fathers, the third is not circumcised at the prescribed time of the 8th day. Rather, we wait until he is strong. In fact, we only circumcise infants who are not sick, for the danger to life suspends all else, for we can always circumcise later, but we cannot restore life. Talmud Shabbat 134a ???
Here too we see judgment — the third, not the first child is our subject; it was undoubtedly known that circumcision included some degree of danger, but judgments were made about the health of the baby, including when circumcision could take place.
Distinctions and Judgments Regarding Danger and the Threat to Life
Talmudic sources in other areas indicate the nature of the danger and situation include distinctions and judgments.
When the conflict is between danger and a ritual act, we have the long history of Talmudic and post-Talmudic halachic rulings. And although Shabbat law is a template, we have seen the other areas that Talmudic law addressed.
But what about when danger conflicts with non-ritual mitzvot and halachot, and what about when danger does not conflict with anything else — except life itself? Can we fairly speak of danger as an unrelated, disembodied concept, in and of itself? I would suggest, when we raise the issues of danger, we ask “in what context,” “compared to what”?
Therefore, I close this section by returning to the original source from the Shulchan Aruch YD 115:5; these are not R Karo’s words, but from the Re”MA (R Moshe Isserles). The Re”Ma did not invent the concept or the examples:
Sefer haChinuch (13th century, Barcelona) in mitzvah # 546 on the parapet, summarized the, including quoting RaMBaM on this matter (Laws of Murder 11:5-7): The purpse of the prohibitions / cautions of the Talmudic Sages is to be protected from injuries and harmful occurrences, for a sound-minded person should not endanger himself, therefore, he should pay attention to all things that could injure him … They include a person not placing his mouth on a pipe to drink from it nor drinking from rivers and lakes lest he swallow a leech. And the Sages forbade drinking from open water due to concern that a poisonous snake may have drank from it. (Chullin 10a) He then cites RaMBaM (Laws of Murder 12:2-4) prohibitng various fruits and vegetables which appear to have been bitten, and to not put coins in one’s mouth due to the transmission of infection from sweat.
But do all of these still apply in our society? And the Re”MA’s words are not actually in harmony with each other. First, Re”MA segues from danger in conflict with ritual prohibition to situations when there is no ritual prohibition. The context of YD 115:5 is within the laws of eating food. In addition, the opening states: “One should be very careful about things which bring one into danger.” Later, he writes: “ … therefore it is forbidden to go to any dangerous place.” “Being careful” is one thing, “forbidden” is another. And the word “any” is all-inclusive. Therefore, the former is undoubtedly true; the latter expresses, and can be, and will be, taken to a disembodied extreme. And that is our current problem. He went far astray from the context, and therefore from the conflict between ritual issues and life in general, and runs with it to what seems intended or at least vulnerable to an existential position in life.
The conflict we now face, and we have been embroiled in it for many weeks, is the conflict between danger and economics, seemingly, Jack Benny’s “Your money or your life?”
Hefsed Merubeh
I now turn to the halachic concept of hefsed merubeh / significant financial loss, and it is a serious enough halachic concept to permit us to modify certain halachic rulings; some applications can be legitimately debated, and it is imprecise, which means it requires judgment.
Now, although halachic conflict between danger and a mitzvah or halachah resulting in suspending the halachah has largely subordinated ritual law to danger, admittedly I could not find any source (I need our scholars to investigate) which pits danger against hefsed merubeh. This is unavoidably part of our equation, the human equation, and it is one that we face now.
The only source I could find that linked the two was an expansion of the heter / permission to flatter the wicked, a form of lying, and therefore a form of cheating or stealing, when faced with life-threatening danger, which is a subset of piku’ach nefesh, to include hefsed merubeh: (Torah Temimah referring to Tosafot on R Shimon b Yochai’s permit, resting on Genesis 33:10 re: Ya’akov flattering Esav.) “Not only (can one flatter the wicked) in a place of real danger, which is obvious, because nothing stands against danger, but (Tosafot) are saying, that even where there is a doubt of wandering, and so too in a case of great financial loss, and the like.” In other words, Torah Temimah citing Tosafot elevates great financial loss to justify flattering / lying to save one life.
But just as there are many sources that highlight danger, though nearly all, as I have repeated, when pitting life-threatening danger against an issur (ritual prohibition) or a chovah / mitzvah (obligation), so too are there several that address a person’s financial condition.
In at least two places (Avodah Zara 5a and Nedarim 64b) the Gemara teaches that “one who is poor is like he is dead.” It is also found in Shemot Rabbah 5:4. (RaSHI also cites the characterization on Bereshit 29:11 — Jacob’s state of mind as he approaches Rachel — and Shemot 4:19 — where he implies that Datan and Aviram did not literally die.) The teaching may seem hyperbolic, but true in its core.
Let’s take another example: Delving into the mitzvah of “V-ahavta l-re’a’cha ka-mocha / You shall love your fellow as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18) Sefer ha-Chinuch (Mitzvah # 243) opens with a single line summary: “We should have compassion on a Jew and on his money just as a person has compassion on himself and his money.” He cites the well-known dictum of R Akiva (Sifra and BT Kiddushin 4:12) “This is a great principle in the Torah” who goes on to say, “a person who loves another like himself will not steal his money, not commit adultery with his wife, not oppress him with his money or with his words …”
Indeed, a large body of Torah and Rabbinic law deals with civil matters, torts, i.e., personal injury and property damage. Explicit in these words and implicit in the sphere of Torah concern is a person’s economic well being. Anything which at least does not address it seriously, in my view, is minimally a distortion and probably an insensitive act of injustice. Therefore, piku’ach nefesh could reasonably have halachic economic applications.
Saving people from financial disaster is a legitimate concern; it is their life, and not as some dismiss it, as the affluent enjoying life while others get sick and die (although that is true in some cases). People have built businesses, invested years and years of hard-earned money, sacrificed, put their hearts and souls into their work, and in some cases took out loans for their businesses, etc. They are and must be responsible to their families and often have concern for the lives of their employees — this is part of the equation, both halachically and from observation and reason. My son, Akiva, suggested that the embarrassment of the provider and employer are also at stake.
But even more literally — without money people die — literally, economic-related suicide is increasing, families are more exposed to and are increasingly suffering from domestic abuse, including children who are now at home who had some refuge in schools. Substance abuse is increasing. Rural hospitals, put under a ban due to direct Covid-19 needs there and elsewhere are closing, leaving populations bereft of medical care. Anxiety itself affects the physical health and well-being of people. Danger has more than one manifestation, and in this case, caring for one may increase the suffering and death of others. It is not for no reason that we also find in Pirkei Avot 2:12 — R Yosi says: “The property of your fellow should be as dear to you as your own …” We are taught to not be cavalier about other’s property.
But that is not all. Economic decline affects the rest of society. When businesses go under, tax revenue decreases, tzedakah may decrease as well, and programs that support the poor will be eliminated. Children will lack food and some will die. Some children depend on schools for their daily nourishment. One has to think through all the ramifications and know that in a world of risk there are no simple answers. And we must be careful with our words.
The Zevulun-Yissachar partnership, where Zevulun financially supports Yissachar’s Torah study was a popular model of sensitivity, appreciation, and understanding. And as we learn from R Elazar b Azariah: “If there is no flour (money) there is no Torah, and if there is no Torah, there is no flour.” (Avot 3:17) As bearers of the whole Torah, we cannot neglect the financial, by narrowly focusing on the specific and limited health danger.
A Personal Note: Danger, Injury, and Death
Before going forward, I will make an obvious observation and then add a personal note: Two to three generations ago, there was more than a reasonable danger of death or injury from travel, i.e, by boats across the Atlantic and in airline travel, as well as anti-Semitism. Things are much better now, but danger exists, because danger is inherent in anything in life. Many still recite the berachah of “gomel” after a safe return, and in our congregation we offer a weekly traveller’s prayer on Shabbat. Some take sedatives or drink alcohol before or during a flight. But then, when technology was less-developed and the statistics reflecting death and injury were higher, were people “forbidden” to travel? Should we forbid travel (after the pandemic ends)? What guides us — danger alone, abstract conceptual thinking? Statistics?
Reasonable danger must be assessed, perhaps statistically, impersonally, but also taking into account the nature of the person. Some people have phobias and others exhibit anxieties toward all danger in life; they have low thresholds of tolerance; they are risk averse. On the other hand, there are others who are bold, even wild; they do not perceive much risk, and if they do, it does not affect them much. (Actually, people’s attitudes toward security and risk differ depending on the particular risk.)
Several years ago, over a short period, many people I knew became seriously injured by falling. About 4 years ago, my mother, in Florida, fell in her home, broke her hip, and was in out-patient rehab for several months. It took a toll on her — and on my father. Then a year and a half ago, my father, one of the healthiest retirees alive at age 87 (he worked out daily, ate healthily), whose mother lived to 103, died falling down the steps at my sister’s home, just a few days after attending our daughter’s wedding. Two years ago, my predecessor, R Ephraim Zimand, fell walking to shul on Shabbat in Yerushalayim, and died just a few days later. Several congregants, either suffered from falls or died from them. Danger exists. Should we then forbid steps? Walking outside? Eating and drinking? Breathing air? Obviously, these are absurd, but where is the real guidance? And how much of our own risk attitudes figure into our thinking?
Judgment
Dreams go according to the Mouth — The Gemara has a wise phrase about dream interpretation, which gained wide currency among the Sages, though the earliest Tanna seems to be R Elazar: כל החלומות הולכין אחר הפה / kol ha-chalomot holchin achar ha peh / “All dreams follow the mouth.” (BT Berachot 55b) Although halachah and science are not quite dream interpretation, each of these also have interpreters. There is an acceptance of shikul da’at, of judges ruling according to what they see, and the famous dictum that “Yiftach in his generation (decides halachah), Shmuel in his.” And we know from halachic disagreements, which are as numerous as the stars in the skies, as well as scientific differences, that the interpreter, halachist, or scientist matters. To be sure, science may appear to have a more narrow range, fact based, and peer reviewed, but nonetheless there are some serious differences.
To some extent, we may be part of the interpreters, especially as we cite our religious sources. As leaders and teachers, we must be careful and refrain from invoking the “danger” alone or too intensely, because we will play into fears, and rather than heal; we will ally ourselves with the darker side of people’s psyche.
But in addition, even the science depends upon the mouth of the interpreter.
As for disease, people die from exposure to many germs and viruses. Coronavirus is similar and different — it is a virus; from science, so far, we know that it affects some more than others, and that some, it appears, may not be affected at all, perhaps are naturally immune to it. Treatments and vaccines are in the works and testing has been a problem. And there is still much we do not know and still much which is changing.
But now we know more about disease, in part due to microscopic technology that can see it and other technology that measures it and addresses it. Germs abound. Several years ago, a Dartmouth study (I believe, but certainly it was in New England) showed that the more we look for things, the more we find them, and the testing itself produces increased anxiety and costs that we cannot tolerate. That is another side of technology. It is complex.
The current science, and there is much we do not yet know about transmission and long-term effects, is still developing. But as of this writing (updated as of May 26, 2020) these are the facts:
Reported Cases | Deaths | Population | |
US | nearly 1,710,941 | 99,950 | 325 million + |
Israel | 16,743 | 281 | 9.5 million |
World | 5,633,413 | 349,073 | 8.7 billion |
You can do the math and calculate the percentages. The other fact is: 36,500 million Americans are now out of work. (MSNBC; Mid-May) And whatever one thinks, government money is not free. Being able to eat, get medicine and medical care, and to live and enjoy life, depends on people working.
A leading thinker from the Hoover Institute, Dr Scott Atlas, a former neuroradiology chief at Stanford, says four things: (1) Curves were flattened; (2) Cases will go up because of testing, reporting, and social relaxation; (3) Fatality from Covid-19 is well lower for those under 60, and that despite media sensationalization, the risk to children extraordinarily low — only 12 so far, whereas 600 children is their estimate for seasonal flu, the risk is far greater. Other scientists have also publicized these numbers.
Yet, many other scientists emphasize the risk and the danger. And they should. They should view the science and analyze it as best as they and their team can.
But it is a reasonable and scientifically based choice to say, “if I am not in my late 60’s and / or do not have a serious condition — diabetes, compromised immune system, my chance of dying is very, very small, my chance of getting Covid-19 is also very small, but my chances of dying economically is great.” On the other hand, increased contact will spread Covid-19, and a certain percentage will not don the masks or keep the distance, and there is much we do not know, and to what extent do we need to sacrifice ourselves for others?
Finally, geography matters and it may not. Those in certain areas, such as the NYC metropolitan area will have a different mindset, than areas that were far less medically affected by Covid-19 than others. Nevertheless, our worlds and our lives are linked, medically and financially. But disease has no borders. So, this is complex.
I have no perfect remedy. We need to protect life from danger and death and there are many ways citizens can protect lives and prevent illness. But I also sympathize with those who are getting sick and are dying financially, especially when there is sound statistical evidence that they are not at great risk. The restrictions are well-intentioned policies, but regard some, even many, regard some decisions as prolonged or over-reactive and misguided, fueled by those who only or primarily see risk in COVID-19 and by leaders who passionately invoke “danger” but who minimize economic suffering. Too many may have the luxury of doing so because their livelihoods are not directly threatened. Faced with economic ruin, judgments change.
I have no sympathy for those who brazenly dismiss the health concerns because they believe they are immune, and / or who care little for those they may infect, who protest in close quarters without masks, who think beach pleasure overrides our responsibilities to one another. (In a parallel see Deuteronomy 29:17ff. ) But there is good reason to support, to some extent, those who need to work, as long as the public will support them and will do so responsibly.
I close with a personal story — actually two that are related to each other, and then related to this article. Until I was 22, I refused several opportunities to fly in an airplane. I had a fear of flying, though more accurately a fear of crashing. I was sure that my life would be cut short. But I deeply wanted to go to Israel, and so I first took a test flight in 1979 to DC to visit a cousin. My next flight was a few months later, in the summer, to Israel; I have since been back about 20 times, and although we often drove to places when we lived on the east coast, in part due to cost, I have flown often domestically and internationally since we moved to St Louis.
What makes this a little more interesting is that my father piloted a private plane. And my personal reference is more about him.
My father had a tough childhood, he was in conflict with almost everyone around him, including his father and his two older brothers. At 17, he left home to join the US Airforce, and because he was underage, he forged his father’s signature. Before he left, his brothers gave him one piece of advice: Do not volunteer.
He served in the Philippines from 1948-1953. His job was as a boxer and a football player. (For those who may not know, some military positions are as entertainers, to keep the spirits of the troops up, like band members.) One day the officer asked for any volunteers to fly a target plane. My father’s hand immediately shot up. He did not see or acutely feel the danger — he saw the opportunity.
When he returned, he enrolled in night school in his native Jersey City, NJ, at St Peter’s College, a Catholic institution, and got into a fight about taking their required religion class. That was him. He earned his BA and went on to work in retail. A few years after I was born (I am the oldest of four) he opened a children’s shoe store, and then another and then a third. But, he wanted to become a teacher, and, while retaining his business, taught for the next 23 years. During that time he continued his education, in his 40’s earning an MA from Rutgers and then a EDd from Temple — commuting from NJ at night to Philadelpia. And then in his 50’s he added a psychology doctorate. He then opened a private counseling practice as well. He even spent another semester in Medical school before deciding enough was enough.
When he was the Men’s Club president of our congregation, he had an idea for a cadillac raffle / dinner dance. No one would support him. He boldly offered to cover any loss, even though he did not have the money to do so. It turned out to be the most successful fundraiser for the congregation for many years.
And during this time he purchased a private plane, fulfilling his early dream. Soon after our second child was born in 1989, my father left the brit milah and at 58 flew his plane to Moscow. And these are only some of the highlights.
Over and over again — at every juncture — he was admonished to not do each and every one of the things he would do — it was too risky and too dangerous. Again, my father either didn’t see the danger, or more likely, the opportunity was so great and he was so unwilling to be encumbered by it, that he did what he did.
I am not him, though I do ride a motorcycle and I have heard the same don’ts. Sometimes the danger is highlighting the danger. I relate this personal story, because I also delve into my life to see what influences make me think as I do, as I too have responsibilities to teach and decide. We should explore our own biases and come to understand others.
Our religious tradition is richer and more complex. And the dream follows the interpreter. Be kind to those who have different views; be kind to those who have to make the decisions.
So, I caution those who emphasize “danger” and find halachic support, to think beyond the invocations of selected texts and be aware of the limitations and the implications. We can still through faith, study and bring wise analysis, both of which are part of the qualifications as rabbis who lead others in the paths of Torah.
Maybe like Jack Benny, we need to think it over. This time it is no joke.
May God soon bring an end to this pandemic. May we do our part as His partners. May God bless you with a healthy life — in all of its forms.
Enjoying UTJ Viewpoints?
UTJ relies on your support to promote an open-minded approach to Torah rooted in classical sources and informed by modern scholarship. Please consider making a generous donation to support our efforts.