What is the Problem With Baruch Spinoza?

In an ongoing shi’ur [study session] dealing with the Halakhic status of the mumar, or the meshummad, the Jew who has willingly and intentionally chosen not to be Torah compliant, I cited as examples Baruch Spinoza and Mordecai M. Kaplan. A learned attendee posed a challenge from Rabbi Nathan Lopes Cardozo, an Orthodox rabbi who found a spiritual purity in Spinoza’s probing individualism. At https://www.cardozoacademy.org/thoughtstoponder/the-latest-controversy-around-spinoza/, R. Cardozo outlines what he believes to be Spinoza’s enduring contribution to contemporary Jewish thought and life:

1. Cardozo flirted with heresy before becoming an Orthodox rabbi. He was, and remains, a spiritually restless seeker. He finds in heresy the challenging notion that in a secular, pluralist world, both belief and heresy are unavoidable choices. The classical Jewish tradition does not stifle conscience-driven dissent, as evidenced by Abraham’s challenging God, “will You put an end to the righteous along with the wicked [regarding the impending destruction of Sodom and ‘Amora],[1]and Moses’ objection to the collective punishment of Israel after the Qorah incident, “[is it appropriate that when “one man sins, You (= God) become frothy [in rage] with the entire people?”[2] Spinoza provides a model for questioning religion, for R. Cardozo.
2. Cardozo neither hides nor denies his own heretical autobiographical experience; his secular and Orthodox intellectual encounters provided him with the dialectic disposition to test and refine his own faith. For R. Cardozo, religious doubt properly and maturely framed and constructively directed may lead to a more perfect and mature faith grounded on truth.
3. For R. Cardozo, authentic Orthodoxy is not a crutch for the comfortable; it is a goad to guide the seeker to goodness.
4. While R. Cardozo affirms his Orthodoxy without apology, R. Cardozo still finds beauty and elegance in Spinoza’s geometric construction and regards Spinoza the person to be a “secular tzaddik,” a term that rings oxymoronic to some if not most Orthodox readers.
5. Cardozo is not blind to Spinoza’s shortcomings. He finds in Spinoza’s thought an intellectual arrogance, and that Spinoza’s thought is too spiritually vague to be lived in historical reality. R. Cardozo also affirms that Hebrew Scripture cannot and may not be read as a mere human cultural artifact. Scripture is not just descriptiveliterature; it must be heard as God’s normative prescription for Israel and for humankind. The secular Spinoza reads the Torah as a book, with the emotional distance and detachment of a third person remoteness; the engaged Orthodox Torah student hears the Torah talking to her or him with an intimate second person direct address to a “you,” or more precisely, like the French second person familiar, “tu.” Put differently, Spinoza needs to see in order to believe, but he is apparently deaf to the Scriptural God’s call to the Scripture’s readers. And R. Cardozo believes in order to see, as one who is open to creativity, innovation, and discovery.
6. Cardozo suggests that Maimonides’ rationalism may have anticipated and even contributed to Spinoza’s heresy and that Judaism does not entertain catechistic dogmas. However, this bold claim is debatable and requires clarification. R. Cardozo contends that Maimonides’ catechism was actually harmful to Judaism. In support of R. Cardozo’s claim are the facts that Maimonides’ thirteen faith principles were not [1] accepted by all Israel or [2] by any Bet Din ha-Gadol, or Jewish religious supreme court that is authorized to issue normative, apodictic legislation that obligates all of Jewry.[3]Furthermore, [3] Maimonides’ positions have been hotly contested by other Rabbinic voices.[4] But R. Cardozo’s claim that in fact there are no Jewish dogmas will not likely resonate to most contemporary Orthodox adherents, for the following reasons. Even conceding that Maimonides is not the only normative voice regarding required Jewish belief, the Oral Torah memorialized[5] the legal norm that maintains that a Jew who in a speech act denies that God will raise the dead to renewed life or that God is the Author of the Torah has forfeited his/her portion in the eternity to come.[6] On one hand, merely denying the divinity of the Torah or the resurrection of the dead in one’s mind, without verbally articulating that thought, might reasonably be considered to be a case of “no foul,” no penalty because what is formally forbidden by the legislated norm is the speech, not just the thought. This being said, these two doctrinal legal norms clearly imply three faith assertions, [1] that the God Who is revealed in and by Scripture is real, and not a mere contrived, semantic construction, [2] this God does communicate to humankind, which is most often done through the medium of prophecy. Recall that God told Moses to appear before Pharaoh as an E-lohim, a Canaanite ilu, or a “divinity” capable of generating an oracle, and Aaron would act as his speaker, that is his nabi. [3] Last, this singular and only God holds humanity to account with regard to compliance with His word, demand, and command. And these three doctrines are Judaism’s functional dogmas according to R. Joseph Albo’s Sefer ha-’Iqqarim,[7] the prerequisite beliefs which ground Hebrew Scripture’s theological coherency.[8]
7. Cardozo’s critique of Maimonides’ theological requirements is not unique to him. For Maimonides, R. Hillel would be considered to be a heretic because he believed that the Messiah already arrived in the time of King Hezeqiah—and ought not to be expected in the future.[9] Albo believes, to my mind correctly, that R. Hillel is in theological error, but, Heaven forfend, R. Hillel should notbe condemned as an apostate. This assertion is justified by the fact that R. Hillel retains his rabbinic honorific in spite of his error,[10] unlike Elisha b. Avuya, who rejected the Torah’s commandments and the Commander’s authority altogether,[11] whose honorific “rabbi” title has been forfeited. Similarly, Raabad’s observation that Maimonides’ claim that believing that the Scriptural God may become flesh [=incarnation] is a heresy cannot be sustained because “bigger and better” authorities[12] than Maimonides, like R. Moshe Taqu in Ketav Tammim[13] and perhaps even Rashi[14], believed that the all-powerful God may indeed appear as a body. Maimonides’ detractors had an even better argument, that unlike the canonical mSanhedrin 10:1, there is in no Oral Torah legislation that I could locate a norm forbidding maintaining this supposedly incorrect belief. Nor is there any evidence that Hebrew Scripture requires of Israel any catechistic affirmations beyond love and trust in God and compliance with God’s law.[15] Furthermore, God is described in Scripture has having an eye,[16] hand,[17] nose,[18] forearm,[19] face,[20] and finger.[21] While a hyper literalist reading of Scripture may be exegetically and theologically inappropriate, the absence of an explicit Oral Torah norm designating that belief to be heretical—and therefore forbidden—is sufficient to exonerate those who maintain these problematic beliefs.
8. Cardozo’s lucid and succinct explanation of Spinoza’s epistemology expresses a deep and sincere respect for Spinoza the man and mind. However, Cardozo rightly objects to Spinoza’s caricature of Oral Torah Judaism, which he attributes to Spinoza’s lack of exposure to Talmudic literature and thought as not experiencing a personal social emersion in a vibrant, Jewish thick culture. In other words, from a culture horizon perspective three and a half centuries after Spinoza’s time, R. Cardozo believes that the Amsterdam Jewish community’s ban on Spinoza should now be rescinded. He writes:

The fact that Spinoza was dead wrong about some crucial matters and that philosophy has moved far beyond his ideas does not detract from his or his books’ merits. I consider him [i.e. Spinoza] a secular tzaddik. He lived by his noble ideas, was dedicated to simplicity, and showed the most remarkable virtuous characteristics. That these were accompanied by intellectual arrogance does not minimize his nobility. In many ways he reminds me of the great mussar personalities – Jewish religious and ethical teachers in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe.[22]

Cardozo’s position is only possible—and intelligible—in modernity. For Orthodox teachers of all stripes, the notion of “secular tzaddik” is oxymoronic. I suspect that R. Cardozo found in Spinoza’s system a highly principled outlook, a sort of secular piety, which he may not personally adopt but is able to appreciate from a distance. After all, a wise person is open to learn from everybody and anybody.[23] But he then adds,

In spite of Spinoza’s lofty ideas in the Ethics, it became clear to me that in his Tractatus Theologico Politicus he was misrepresenting Judaism in ways that were most disturbing. For some of this, he could not be blamed. But it became evident that several of his misrepresentations were clearly deliberate and against his better knowledge. This shocked me to the core.[24]

Spinoza names his God “Substance.”[25] This term refers to everything and, as a consequence, means nothing. And Mordecai M. Kaplan’s God, “the power that makes for salvation,”[26] reflects the perceived need of a non-believer to adopt a stance of “innocence of association” by affirming a “God concept” in order to sell a social construction to a target population.[27]

Hakham Professor Jose Faur argues that the historical Spinoza is imagining

a self-contained and categorically autonomous universe. By insisting on a totally homogonous universe, Spinoza denied religion its traditional arguments. Thus Spinoza not only freed the mind from the authority of religion, he also broke the grid “Church-State,” ushering in a new era, that of secularism.[28]

For Prof. Faur, Spinoza, was the first secular Jew, who on one hand abandoned Judaism but nevertheless chose not to adopt Christianity, on the other.[29] He adopted the converso ideology which alienated its victims from Judaism, the oppressed religion, but could, would, and did not allow him adopt the religion of the oppressor,[30] the Church of Rome. As such, Spinoza became the model of modern secularism.

According to Prof. Faur, Spinoza’s leaving the Jewish people must be seen as a betrayal of the Jewish people, and for him, Spinoza is no hero. But there is a critical difference between the historical Spinoza who is a product of a bygone age, with its unique time horizon, the dawn of modernity, with its ethos and challenges. R. Cardozo’s Spinoza is a very different persona and construct. Recalling that R. Cardozo confessed that he himself was first a heretic who eventually became an Orthodox rabbi, his “heresy” moved him to reconsider the challenges of and problems with unbelief. By experiencing both belief and unbelief over the course of his life, R. Cardozo understands both positions but only affirms the former. It is no accident that the word heresy stems from a root meaning “to make a choice.”[31] In modernity, belief is ultimately a choice, and not a foregone fact determined by social inertia. By rehabilitating his constructed Spinoza, R. Cardozo extends the boundaries of social Orthodoxy in order to nurture an Orthodoxy that is inoculated with just enough heresy to create the defense immunity of a faith so strong that it resists faithlessness. Essentially, R. Cardozo’s Spinoza seems to be a model for a big tent, inclusivist Orthodox Judaism that welcomes sincere reflection, integrity driven consciences, and a plurality of religiously authentic Orthodox positions. [32]

Cardozo’s keen analytic eye candidly recognized that Spinoza was not always intellectually honest. Nevertheless, R. Cardozo maintains that doubters’ questions reflect a sincere engagement of ideas and binding to the object of and in doubt. R. Cardozo’s Orthodoxy regards the ultimate enemy of religion to be apathetic indifference, not the so-called “heresy” of doubt. After all, doubters are engaged and belong inside the Orthodox tent,[33] while indifference keeps people from even considering religion and God’s presence altogether.

[1] Genesis 18:23.

[2] Numbers 16:22. These are rhetorical questions, consistent with the Torah Covenant morality which obligates God as well as Israel.

[3] Ravina I and Rav Ashi were the last Amoraic sages who were authorized to issue/legislate apodictic norms. bBava Metsi’a 86a.

[4] Notably, Nahmanides and the French School was strongly opposed to Maimonidean rationalism. See Jose Faur, In the Shadow of History: Jews and Conversos at the Dawn of Modernity (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1991), pp. 12-14. For full disclosure, the author is my rav muvhaq, the mentor who shaped my own Jewish world view.

[5] mSanhedrin 10:1 is an uncontested canonical document that memorializes Tannaitic rabbinic norms.

[6] “World” is the conventional but imprecise rendering of ‘olam’ in this context. The Mishnah’s cited proof text, Isaiah 60:21,” is actually cited not only as a prooftext, that being part of Israel is sufficient for vindication and justification, “possessing eternity forever. “’Arets” here refers to the next world, as in Exodus 15:12, which likely refers to the netherworld, and the Lord will destroy “Death,” in the intensive pi’el conjugation. See Isaiah 25:8 and https://emp.byui.edu/satterfieldb/ugarit/The%20Epic%20of%20Baal.html.

[7] Sefer ha-‘Iqqarim ]1:1].

[8] Psalms 10:4. 14:1, and 53:2.

[9] bSanhedrin 98b.

[10] Ibid.

[11] pHagiga 2:1 and bHagiga 15b-16a. Upon consorting with a “lady of the evening,” the illicit pleasure professional whom he approached gave him his unflattering knickname, aher, the “other,” as he was no longer a member of the Torah covenant community and unlike R. Hillel, forfeited his rabbinic honorific.

[12] Raabad, Objections to Maimonides, Yad Compendium, Teshuvah 3:7.

[13] See http://www.hashkafacircle.com/journal/R3_DS_Taku.pdf. It may be that the idea of a corporeal “God” was not foreign to French rabbis living in a theological world in which the “incarnation” was an important doctrine.

[14] https://hakirah.org/Vol%207%20Slifkin.pdf.

[15] Ecclesiastes 12:13-14.

[16] Deuteronomy 11:12.

[17] Exodus 9:3.

[18] Deuteronomy 23:16.

[19] Exodus 7:6 and Deuteronomy 4:34.

[20] Genesis 19:13 and Exodus 32:11.

[21] Exodus 8:15.

[22] https://www.cardozoacademy.org/thoughtstoponder/the-latest-controversy-around-spinoza/.

[23] mAvot 4:1.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm, 1:6-8.

[26] Conveniently at https://kaplancenter.org/?s=salvation.

[27] For Spinoza and Kaplan, God is not the Author of the Torah or the Commander of the Torah’s commandments. For them, the Biblical and Rabbinic God is not real, but a God “idea” is required to justify a religious self-identity.

[28] Faur, supra footnote 4, p. 142.

[29] Ibid. p. 143. See Maimonides, Teshuva 3:11, who regards separation from the Jewish people as a violation so odious that one who does separate from the Jewish people forfeits her/his portion in the eternity to come.

[30] Ibid., pp. 143-144. According to Prof. Faur, this ideology spawned the deism of the French “Enlightenment.”

[31] From the Greek, hairesis.

[32] For example, see R. Gil Student’s superb defense of interfaith relations with non-Jewish religions, while retaining Orthodox integrity, at https://www.torahmusings.com/2022/11/rabbi-sacks-religious-pluralism-a-halakhic-and-hashkafic-defense/?utm_source=Klaviyo&utm_medium=campaign&_kx=cFQsWk4OJ_Iki8jn7UABPYPFvqLTCwD4pG3Lmg45rRCEhw7od6sRZPrgJofUzVZi.L87CGh.

[33] At a lecture on the Passover seder, my REITS Rav Moshe D. Tendler reminded his students that the alienated son must be welcomed, with his questions, at the Seder. If the alienated child is not present at the seder, answers to his questions will be offered at far less congenial forums than the traditional Passover seder. He then argued that Yeshiva University must teach Bible criticism to its undergraduates, if only in order to prepare and inoculate its graduates from unfriendly, adversarial challenges when competent, Orthodox mentors are not available.